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Abstract—With the rapid development of health equipments,
increasingly more patients have installed the implantable medical
devices (IMD) in their bodies for diagnostic, monitoring, and
therapeutic purposes. IMDs are extremely limited in compu-
tation power and battery capacity. Meanwhile, IMDs have to
communicate with an external programmer device (i.e., IMD
programmer) through the wireless channel, which put them under
the risk of unauthorized access and malicious wireless attacks. In
this paper, we propose a proxy-based fine-grained access control
scheme for IMDs, which can prolong the IMD’s lifetime by
delegating the access control computations to the proxy device
(e.g., smartphone). In our scheme, the proxy communicates with
the IMD programmer through an audio cable, which is resistant to
a number of wireless attacks. Additionally, we use the ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) to enforce fine-
grained access control. The proposed scheme is implemented on
real emulator devices and evaluated through experimental tests.
The experiments show that the proposed scheme is lightweight
and effective.
Index Terms—Implantable medical device, access control,
proxy, attribute-based encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
IMDs are the particular type of medical devices that are
implanted in the patient’s body, to diagnose, monitor, or treat
a variety of conditions, diseases and injuries. For example,
insulin pump can monitor and deliver insulin to treat diabetes,
pacemaker regulate the beating of the heart using electrical
impulses, neurostimulator sends electrical signals to the spine
to treat chronic pains. According to a recent report published
by Allied Market Research [1], the global IMD market is
projected to reach $116.3 billion by 2022. However, IMDs are
threatened by both external cyber attacks and internal flaws
in software or firmware design. These security vulnerabilities
allow an adversary to steal sensitive medical data, reset the
configuration parameters, and issue unauthorized commands to
an IMD, which could cause fatal consequences.
IMDs are equipped with a radio transceiver to communicate
with the external IMD programmer. The IMD programmer
is the specific device used to collect the medical data from
IMDs and issue operation/configuration commands to deliver
drug, change dosage, etc. With the wireless interface enabled,
IMDs can be accessed by an authorized operator in physical
proximity via the IMD programmer (e.g., an eligible medical
staff or the patient himself/herself). However, the wireless
communication and networking capabilities of IMDs turn out
to be the major sources of security vulnerabilities. Due to the
broadcast nature of wireless channels, all messages exchanged
between the IMD and the programmer can be captured by
eavesdroppers. This would not only expose the patient privacy
like he/she is carrying an IMD to treat a certain disease, but
also lead to other classic wireless attacks such as the forging,
tampering, and replying of the messages. Existing research
works have presented the breaches in a number of commercial
IMDs [2], [21], [27], [30], [33], including the implantable
cardioverter defibrillator (ICD), insulin pump and pacemaker. It
has been demonstrated how an adversary can reverse-engineer
the communication protocol and take full control of the IMD
using a software radio.
Intuitively, to secure the communications between the IMD
and the IMD programmer, a pair of symmetric keys must be
shared between the two parties to encrypt their wireless com-
munications. Unlike traditional electronic devices, the power
supply of IMDs is highly constrained. The wireless charging
technologies for IMDs still need lots of practical testing and
clinical trials to ensure that no negative effect will be caused
to human organs and tissues. Additionally, the replacement
of an IMD or its battery requires invasive surgery. Hence,
commercial IMD products are designed to last for 5 to 10
years. The energy consumption of IMDs should be minimized,
by avoiding complicated cryptographic computations and long-
range wireless communications. Currently, only symmetric
cryptography is considered for the data encryption in IMDs.
In this paper, we propose a novel proxy-based access control
scheme for IMDs, in which the communications between the
IMD programmer and the proxy are conducted through an
audio cable rather than the conventional wireless channels. The
proposed scheme employs the attribute-based access control
model, which grants access based on the attributes (i.e., qualifi-
cations) that the access requestor owns. Meanwhile, the access
requestor is authenticated in our scheme, mainly to provide
accountability in case of a medical dispute.
Our major contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We first comprehensively studied and analyzed various
existing IMD access control schemes in terms of the access
control architecture and access control model. We also took
a full consideration of the special use cases that a good IMD
control scheme should be able to handle.
2) Our proxy-based IMD access control scheme can greatly
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alleviate the computational overhead and power consump-
tion of IMDs. The proxy communicates with the IMD
programmer via the audio cable, which can defend against
the wireless passive and active attacks. Unlike USB con-
nection, communications through headphone jack does not
require the patient to unlock the device for manual approval,
which is a practical concern especially for patients who are
unconscious.
3) Our scheme adopts the ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption (CP-ABE) to provide a fine-grained access con-
trol over the qualifications of the programmer operator.
Specifically, the proxy encrypts the temporary session key
with a specific access policy and sends the ciphertext to the
IMD programmer. If the programmer operator owns the set
of required attributes (qualifications), the temporary session
key can be correctly retrieved.
4) We implemented our scheme on real emulator devices: the
IMD is emulated by TelosB mote, the proxy is emulated
by smartphone, and the IMD programmer is emulated by
Rasberry Pi 3. The evaluation results show that the proposed
scheme is lightweight and effective.
II. BACKGROUND
IMD manufacturers are supposed to give equal attentions to
the security of their products, as to their functionalities. How-
ever, when facing security vulnerabilities, the manufacturers
that should take full responsibility seem to be numb towards
the potential security problems. In May 2014, an independent
security researcher Billy Rios discovered 100 vulnerabilities
in the communications system software of several different
versions of infusion pumps made by the medical device com-
pany Hospira (HSP), which can be exploited by an attacker
to hack into the pumps and change the dosage of medication
to be delivered [6]. Rios immediately notified Hospira, but
Hospira stayed silent on the issue until another researcher
Jeremy Richards publicly disclosed the vulnerability in April
2015. Then, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and the Department of Homeland Security’s Industrial Control
Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team followed up the
issue, and sent out advisories notifying hospitals of the danger
of Hospira pumps and encouraging the transition to alternative
infusion systems [14]. Although the governmental agency FDA
is obliged to supervise and regulate the IMD industry, it only
provides guidelines and recommendations for IMD security
which are not legally binding [13], [15]. There is no checking
or verification of new IMD products (software and hardware)
and their cybersecurity documentations by a trusted agency.
The security and robustness of IMDs still rely on the research
and development team of each individual manufacturers, who
design access control schemes only specific to their own
products.
III. MOTIVATION
The security researchers have been seeking generalized and
effective access control schemes for IMDs. A variety of access
control schemes have been proposed with different access con-
trol models and architectures. In addition, various assumptions
have been made on the environmental settings and human
factors. In this section, we conduct a thorough analysis on all
these aspects, and present how we are motivated to design our
novel IMD access control scheme.
A. Special Use Cases
IMD access control is not a difficult problem under regular
situations such as when the patient uses his/her own IMD
programmer to access the IMD or when an acquainted doctor
wants to access the IMD. However, it becomes much more
complicated in some special but practical situations.
1) Medical Emergency: In medical emergency conditions
such as when the patient falls sick while travelling out of
town and needs immediate treatment, the patient has to verify
the authenticity and qualification of the stranger who attempts
to access the IMD (e.g., emergency medical technician). In a
worse case, the patient may have been unconscious and is not
able to manually verify the programmer operator. Hence, to
deal with the emergency cases, an effective IMD access control
scheme requires:
1) All eligible medical personnels should have access to the
IMD, regardless of whether they have been granted access
before or if the patient is acquainted with them.
2) The access decision can be made autonomously by the IMD,
without the patient’s involvement.
3) If the access is permitted, the IMD must first be paired up
with the programmer so that a pair of symmetric keys are
shared between them, to encrypt their communications.
2) Internet Connection: Online authentication has been
widely used in IT applications. Intuitively, offloading authen-
tication to a dedicated server of a governmental health agency
or hospital can greatly reduce the complexity of the access
control computations running on IMDs [31], [37]. This requires
either the IMD (may be assisted by an external proxy) or the
programmer to be able to connect to the Internet. However,
Internet connection may not be always available, especially
when the patient is located in a depopulated area with poor
infrastructure. Hence, a robust IMD access control scheme
should not rely on online authentication.
B. Adversary Model
The common assumptions agreed by existing works regard-
ing the capabilities of the attackers in IMD context include:
• The adversary may be equipped with powerful software radio
transmitter, hence is able to interact with the IMD in a long
distance.
• The adversary may obtain legitimate IMD programmer to
access the IMD. Since IMD programmers are specialized
devices running closed-source software programs, they are
considered secure and cannot be hacked by the attacker.
• The adversary cannot approach the patient within a security
range (typically 10 cm), nor can the adversary make physical
contact with the patient or the patient’s personal belongings,
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Fig. 1. IMD Access Control Architecture
deterred from leaving criminal evidence such as fingerprint
or video taken by surveillance cameras.
Generally, two types of adversaries may exist depending on
the attack tactics: passive adversary and active adversary. A
passive adversary will only eavesdrop on the wireless channel
and listen to the packets exchanged between the IMD and
the IMD programmer. Given an unencrypted radio channel, a
passive attack can break the confidentiality of the data being
transmitted. Almost all existing access control schemes require
encrytions over the wireless channel, hence are resistant to
passive attackers. An active adversary, however, can replay or
tamper the packets. If the communication protocol between
the IMD and the programmer is reverse-engineered, the active
attacker is able to send unauthorized commands to the IMD
(e.g. changing the configurations and parameters). Based on
the purposes of the attacks launched by an active adversary,
we can classify active attacks into three categories:
• Unauthorized access. The goal of this type of attacks is to
bypass the access control scheme and gain access to the IMD
without authorization.
• Resource depletion. This type of attacks repeatedly requests
for access to the IMD, causing the IMD to continuously
running the access control computations, while its actual
intention is to drain the battery power and reduce the lifetime
of the IMD.
• Denial-of-service (DoS). DoS attacks aim to disrupt the
authorized access to the IMD, by interfering the communi-
cations between the IMD and the programmer. As the result,
the IMD is unable to serve the incoming requests.
The resource depletion attacks and DoS attacks are not
the focus of this paper. Many previous works have proposed
effective schemes to solve the resource depletion attacks on
IMDs. Liu et al. [29] suggested to add an extra wake-up
circuit before the main circuit of the IMD, which employs
the passive RFID technology so as to harvest energy from
the incoming signal to perform the verification of the wake-
up code. The main circuit is waked up only if the wake-
up code is correct. Gollakota et al. [16] presented Shield to
protect the confidentiality of the IMD, which utilizes a novel
full-duplex radio design with a jamming antenna and a receive
antenna, allowing it to simultaneously receive the IMD’s signal
and jam the IMD’s messages. Consequently, the programmer
cannot receive IMD’s packets or directly interact with it. Hei
et al. [24] proposed to train the normal IMD access patterns
and detect unusual access requests using the support vector
machine (SVM). The DoS attacks, however, have been evaded
in existing works. Since the IMD is installed inside human
body and has to interact with the programmer over a wireless
channel, an attacker can just block/interfere its communications
by jamming the wireless channel. Although the DoS attacks can
be easily detected, there is no effective and low-cost solution
to prevent it.
Instead, our paper focuses on enhancing the IMD access
control in terms of lower complexity and better granularity.
C. Access Control Architecture
1) Two-party Access Control: The basic IMD access control
architecture is composed of two parties. As illustrated in
Figure 1(a), the access object is the IMD and the subject is
the programmer and its operator.
2) Proxy-based Access Control: To reduce the energy
consumption of the IMD, the proxy-based access control ar-
chitecture has been proposed [8], [24], [40], [41], which take
advantage of a proxy device to delegate the heavy computations
for the IMD. As shown in Figure 1(b), the proxy can be a
smartphone or other wearable device (e.g., smart watch, smart
bracelet) with more sufficient computational resources and
battery capacity. The communications between the IMD and the
proxy are protected by the lightweight symmetric encryption,
which can be considered safe given that a pair of symmetric
keys have been distributed and shared securely during the initial
setup. This is reasonable since the initial setup is conducted
either by the doctor when the IMD is implanted or by the
patient when the proxy is used for the first time. It is very
difficult for a malicious eavesdropper to overhear the key being
transmitted to IMD at these specific moments. After pair-up,
the proxy device will perform the access control on behalf of
the IMD.
The proxy-based access control depends on the presence
of the proxy device. In the particular case that the proxy is
not detected in vicinity, the commonly used solution is that
the IMD will enter the open-access mode, in which it only
verifies the physical proximity of the programmer and permits
the incoming access requests from any programmer nearby.
This allows eligible physicians to be still able to access the
IMD when the proxy is damaged or lost. Later, patient can
pair up the IMD with a new proxy using its unique master key.
A copy of this master key is provided to the patient by the IMD
manufacturer along with the product manual. Meanwhile, the
IMD manufacturer or the hospital should keep a backup copy
of the master key for the patient to retrieve from.
However, we are aware that the usage of a proxy device
may increase the attack surface of the IMD access control.
Two types of attacks targeted at the proxy may exist:
• Jamming attacks. The adversary may attempt to bypass
the access control performed by the proxy, by selectively
jamming the messages of the proxy to spoof the IMD about
the absence of the proxy.
• Malware-based attacks. If the proxy is a general-purpose
device like smartphone, the adversary can attack through
a pre-installed malware. However, since Android OS and
iOS both use sandboxing to isolate applications from each
other, the malware cannot compromise the client application
running the access control program. Instead, it can only
eavesdrop or disrupt the communications between the proxy
and the IMD/programmer.
Our scheme employs the proxy-based access control archi-
tecture. Note that we do not specifically address the jamming-
based spoofing attack - our access control scheme can nicely
integrate with existing solution [40]. Additionally, we do not
propose new access control method for the particular case in
which the proxy is indeed absent. The existing coarse-grained
proximity-based access control schemes [5], [23], [25], [26],
[34], [35] can be adopted to protect the IMD under such
circumstances.
D. Access Control Model
There are three types of traditional access control models
that may be applied in IMD context.
• Identity-based access control (IBAC): a user is permitted
or denied access based on whether the user appears in the
access control list that contains all of the authorized users.
• Role-based access control (RBAC): the access permission
is granted to a group of people who have a common role.
• Attribute-based access control (ABAC): a set of attributes
are created and assigned to subjects to enforce the access
control. The access rule is defined as a mixing of attributes,
and the decision is made by matching the attributes required.
In fact, most existing access control schemes are not de-
signed under traditional models, but instead are simplified to
accommodate the resource-limited IMD:
• Pre-shared secret based access control: Some works as-
sume that the IMD and the programmer have pre-shared
secret like a master key [21] or rolling code [27]. However,
considering that the IMD may be accessed by any doctor
in emergency situations, the pre-distribution of the secret of
each IMD to all possible doctors is not practical.
• Proximity-based access control: Some existing schemes
manage access control solely based on physical proximity
[5], [7], [22], [23], [25], [26], [34], [35]. Although proximity
is sufficient under the adversary model that the attacker will
not approach the patient or make physical contact, it can only
provide coarse-grained access control in which the identity
of the requesting programmer operator is not authenticated.
To enable the authentication of the programmer operator,
public-key cryptography must be used, which is feasible in the
proxy-based access control architecture. However, considering
that online authentication is unavailable and it is not practical
to store the information of the huge number of eligible medical
personnel into a local ACL on the proxy, IBAC model is not a
viable option in IMD context. Instead, ABAC allows the multi-
dimensional rules/policies (not just based on the identity or a
simple role) to be enforced for fine-grained access control, e.g.,
the specialty and affiliation of the physician, the certificate of
the eligibility to operate a certain model of IMD, etc.
Therefore, our scheme employs the ABAC model to ver-
ify the qualifications of the access requestor. Meanwhile, to
provide accountability in medical disputes, the proxy also
authenticates the programmer operator and (if authorized) will
record the access details (i.e., start time, end time) into a log
as the evidence.
E. Communications through Audio Cable
In the proxy-based access control architecture, the proxy
needs to first build a secured connection with the IMD
programmer. However, for general-purpose proxy device like
smartphone, setting up a local connection with an external
device (e.g. IMD programmer) via Bluetooth, NFC, or USB
requires either the phone to be in the unlocked mode or the
manual approval on the smartphone (also when the phone
is unlocked). This means such types of connections will be
unavailable when the smartphone is locked and the patient
has gone unconscious, as the programmer operator does not
know the password to unlock the patient’s phone. According
to the recent data from Duo Labs, 34% Android smartphones
are not secured with a lock-screen passcode [32]. In another
word, about 2/3 of phone users have enabled the screen-locking
function. Therefore, we must choose a connection channel that
is secure and available regardless of the patient’s involvement.
We found that most modern smartphones have a headphone
jack/port and most commercial IMD programmers have a USB
port. A smartphone serving as the proxy can be connected
with an IMD programmer through an audio cable. As shown
in Figure 2, the one end of the audio cable is plugged into
the smartphone’s headphone port while the other end links to
an audio-to-USB adapter, which is then plugged into the USB
port of the programmer. The audio-to-USB adapter is actually
an external sound card with digital-to-analog converter (DAC)
and analog-to-digital converter (ADC), hence the analog signal
transmitting over the audio cable can be converted into digital
data, or vice versa. The access control mobile application
is always running in the background, ready to process the
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Fig. 2. Architecture of Access Control with Wired Connection
incoming requests from the audio cable. The advantages of
using the audio cable for communications include:
• No patient involvement required. The data can be trans-
mitted through audio cable in a plug-and-play manner, even
if the phone is in the lock-up mode.
• Reduce the attack surface. The packets exchanged are
no longer exposed in the air. The remote adversary cannot
overhear or jam the communications.
• Reduce the energy consumption. Wireless transmissions
consume at least 10 times more power than wired transmis-
sions when providing comparable access rates and traffic
volumes [3]. Although both proxy and programmer are
assumed to have sufficient power, energy saving becomes
a critical concern when the phone battery is low.
• Proof of proximity. The programmer operator needs to plug
the audio cable into the headphone port of the smartphone,
which proves the proximity of the operator to the patient.
• Low cost. The audio cable connection does not require extra
hardware. An audio-to-USB adapter only costs around $10.
IV. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
Our scheme achieves attribute-based access control using the
attribute-based encryption (ABE) technique. ABE is a one-to-
many encryption method, which allows data to be encrypted
based on a set of attributes, so that only those users who own
the specified attributes are able to correctly decrypt. ABE is
collusion-resistant, which can prevent colluding users to gain
access by combining their associated attributes, if none of them
possesses the full set of required attributes.
There are two major types of ABE schemes: Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [17] and Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [4]. In KP-ABE,
users’ secret keys are generated based on an access tree (i.e.
access policy) whose leaves are associated with attributes,
and the data are encrypted over a set of attributes. Since
the access policy is embedded in the decryptor’s secret keys,
the data encryptor has no control over who can access the
data. However, in the IMD access control context, the proxy
must check the programmer operator’s qualifications, which
are formed as a policy composed of a specific set of attributes.
This requirement can be satisfied by CP-ABE, in which the
users’ secret keys are generated over a set of attributes and the
ciphertext specifies the access policy.
Therefore, we adopt CP-ABE to implement the IMD access
control. Specifically, the proxy encrypts the verification mes-
sage with CP-ABE and sends the ciphertext to the programmer.
The programmer can successfully decrypt the message only if
the operator’s attributes satisfy the access policy specified in
the ciphertext. In contrast, the adversaries cannot decrypt the
ciphertext, even if they collude. The CP-ABE scheme consists
of the following four fundamental algorithms:
• Setup(k). The Setup algorithm takes a security parameter k
as input and randomly picks two exponents, to calculate the
public parameters PK and the master key MK. PK will
be used for encryption, while MK will be used to generate
users’ secret keys and is known only to the central authority.
• Encryption(PK,M, T ). The encryption algorithm takes as
input the public parameters PK, a plaintext message M ,
and an access tree structure T over the universe of attributes.
This algorithm will encrypt M , and produce a ciphertext CT
which only users who possess a set of attributes that satisfies
the access structure T are able to decrypt.
• Key Generation(MK,S). The secret key generation algo-
rithm takes as input the set of attributes S that user U owns,
the master key MK, and randomly selects a set of |S| + 1
numbers specific to user U . It outputs a secret key SK.
• Decrypt(PK,CT, SK). The decryption algorithm takes as
input the public parameters PK, a ciphertext CT which
contains the access policy T , and a secret key SK generated
from attribute set S. If the set S of attributes satisfies the
access policy T , the algorithm will successfully decrypt the
ciphertext and return the plaintext message M .
V. PROTOCOL DESIGN
A. System Overview
• IMD. Each IMD has a unique identification IDi and a master
key KMi . Note that the master key is only used for pairing up
the IMD with a proxy device, and will not directly participate
the access control procedure.
• Programmer. The programmer can be simply viewed as the
terminal device used by its operator to interact with the IMD
or proxy. It obtains all information required for access control
(e.g., secret keys, certificates) from the operator, by manual
input or reading in from a smart card.
• Operator. The programmer operator is the actual subject to
be verified. All legitimate operators must first be registered
at a Central Health Authority (CHA), which manages the
qualifications of operators and issues digital certificates for
them. Each operator has a unique identification IDo, a pair of
public/private keys KU and KR, and a public key certificate
Cert. The qualifications that an operator owns correspond to
IMDProxyProgrammer
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Fig. 3. Access Control Procedure
a set of attributes S. CHA will generate the secret key SK
for the operator based on the set of attributes S. SK can
be used to decrypt the ciphertext produced by CP-ABE if
the access policy is satisfied. Besides, all operators know the
public parameters PK used in CP-ABE.
• Proxy. The proxy device has the identification IDp. There is
a client program running on the proxy to perform the access
control for the IMD. The proxy has been paired up with the
IMD through initial setup. The client program has a copy
of the public parameters PK used to run CP-ABE, and is
able to generate the access tree (policy) T that describes the
qualifications required for access.
B. Access Control Protocol Design
The access control procedure includes two separate pro-
cesses: the authentication of the programmer operator and the
authorization for access.
Although the IBAC model is not suitable in IMD context and
we utilize attributes to control access instead, it is still neces-
sary to authenticate the identity of the programmer operator.
One reason for that is to provide non-repudiation guarantee in
case of medical disputes. For example, a programmer operator
cannot deny his/her access if the start time and end time
of the access have been signed by his/her own private key.
The other reason is that the ciphertext CT generated by
CP-ABE contains the access policy in plaintext. The access
policy specifies the expected qualifications of the authorized
physicians (e.g., speciality) and the information related to the
IMD model (e.g., the certifications required to operate), which
are all very sensitive with regard to the patient’s privacy and
should not be publicly accessible to anyone who requests for
access. Therefore, our scheme authenticates the programmer
operator before the authorization stage, so that only a legitimate
operator who has registered at CHA (not necessarily authorized
to access) can continue to the authorization process and view
the access policy.
In the authorization stage, the proxy encrypts a randomly
generated temporary session key Kt with CP-ABE and sends
the ciphertext to the programmer. If the operator is an eligible
physician whose qualifications (attributes) satisfy the access
policy, the session key Kt can be correctly retrieved and used
to establish a secured communication channel with the IMD.
The access control procedure is presented in Figure 3. We
assume that the proxy device has already been paired up with
the IMD, and a pair of symmetric keys Ks have been shared
between them for encrypted communications. The detailed
procedure is described as follows:
1) The programmer initializes the access control protocol by
connecting with the proxy via audio cable, and sending
an access request which is composed of a unique action
sequence “access req”, the operator’s digital certificate
Cert, a random selected session number SN , timestamp
t1, and a signature Sig1 signed by the operator’s private
key KR. The certificate contains the operator’s public
key KP and identification IDo. The signature Sig1 =
SignKR(IDo|SN |t1) is attached to prove that the current
access requestor is indeed IDo.
2) The access control mobile application has registered a
receiver of the headset connection state changes. When
this program is notified of the plug-in event, it will read
in and demodulate the audio data. If the action sequence
“access req” can be found in the demodulated data, it
indicates that the data is for IMD access request instead of
regular audio (e.g., music). Then it extracts and verifies the
received Sig1 using the requestor’s certified public key KP
embedded in Cert. If the signature is valid, the programmer
operator is successfully authenticated. The proxy will next
check if that operator is authorized to access. Specifically,
it randomly generates a temporary session key Kt and
encrypts Kt using CP-ABE. Then, the produced ciphertext
CT = EˆPK,T (Kt) is sent back to the programmer.
3) The programmer decrypts CT with the operator’s secret key
SK (generated and assigned by the CHA). If the operator’s
qualifications (attributes) satisfy the access policy, the secret
key SK will be able to retrieve the temporary session key
Kt. Then, it calculates the hash value of Kt and sends the
hash value to the proxy.
4) The proxy also calculates the hash value of Kt with the
same hash function. If the two hash values are equal,
it indicates that the programmer operator is eligible for
access. The proxy will inform the IMD that the programmer
IDo has been authenticated and is authorized to access,
and sends a copy of the session key Kt to IMD. Note
that all communications to/from the IMD are conducted
in the wireless channel, which may suffer eavesdropping,
replay, and tampering attacks. Hence, the session key is
encrypted by the shared key Ks to prevent eavesdropping.
A timestamp t2 is added to defend replay attacks. The
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) of the
message is calculated using Ks to ensure the authenticity
and integrity of the message.
5) After receiving the authorization notification from the proxy,
the IMD retrieves the Kt and sends “ready” message to the
programmer.
6) In the mutual communications between the IMD and the
programmer, the operation commands C sent by the pro-
grammer and the data/result D returned by the IMD are
all encrypted using the temporary session key Kt. Each
authorization permits multiple operations (e.g., data reading,
drug delivery). We only draw one round of operation in
Figure 3 for illustration. The timestamps and HMACs are
also adopted in the communications between the IMD and
the programmer to defeat various active wireless attacks.
7) After the programmer has completed the access, it sends a
“logout” notification message to the proxy. Another signa-
ture Sig2 = SignKR(IDo|SN |t5) is generated in which
the access end time t5 is signed.
8) Finally, the proxy will notify the IMD that the current
session has ended so that the session key Kt will be
removed. Timestamp t6 and HMAC4 are included in the
this message.
Our scheme asks the programmer to explicitly log out the
session, and requires it to sign the time that session ends.
Therefore, Sig1 and Sig2 together can prove that the operator
has accessed the IMD in that period of time. Any wrong
operations performed in this period will be attributed to that
specific operator. The programmer should maintain the wired
connection with the proxy during interacting with the IMD, to
eliminate the possibility that a second programmer is connected
with the proxy while the first one is still interacting with the
IMD. However, it may happen that the programmer does not
sign out by the end of its session for certain reasons, a time-out
mechanism is used to tackle this situation. Specifically, if there
is no interaction made by the programmer for a fixed amount
of time Tout, the session will be closed and the session key Kt
will be disabled.
Fig. 4. Prototype Setup
Fig. 5. Illustration of Signal Modulated by BFSK
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Resistance to Passive Attacks
In the wireless channel, the adversary is able to eavesdrop
the communications between the proxy and the IMD, as well
as between the programmer and the IMD, to obtain the data,
operation commands, or keys being transmitted. To defend
against such passive wireless attack, all sensitive information
is protected with symmetric encryptions. Specifically, a pair
of keys Ks have been pre-shared by IMD and the proxy
(during initial setup), and another pair of keys Kt are securely
distributed to IMD and the programmer. The adversary cannot
decrypt the ciphertexts without the cryptographic keys.
Over the audio cable, even if the proxy has been infected
by malware which will overhear the audio data received by the
proxy, our scheme can ensure that it cannot obtain any sensitive
information. The temporary session key Kt is encrypted by
CP-ABE. The malware cannot correctly derive the plaintexts
without the required qualifications (attributes). Additionally, it
cannot infer Kt from its hash value H(Kt).
B. Resistance to Active Attacks
In the wireless channel, all messages containing sensitive
information are timestamped to prevent replay attacks. In
addition, a HMAC is calculated using the corresponding shared
keys (Ks between the proxy and the IMD, or Kt between the
programmer and the IMD), to defeat the tampering attacks.
Over the audio cable, the malware on the proxy can send
arbitrary messages to the programmer or tamper the messages
sent by the application running the access control. In our
TABLE I
PARAMETERS USED FOR MODULATION AND DEMODULATION
Parameter Value
Sampling rate 44100Hz
Pulse-code modulation
(PCM) bit depth 16
f0 1575Hz
f1 3150Hz
Baud rate 315
scheme, the only outgoing message to the programmer via
the wired audio channel is CT . However, either the replay
or manipulation of this message cannot help an unauthorized
programmer operator to gain access, since only eligible opera-
tors can successfully decrypt CT and retrieve the session key
Kt.
C. Other Attacks
Over the audio cable, the mobile malware can add noise
to the audio data sent by the access control application, but
this sort of attacks can only disrupt the access of legitimate
operators (e.g. causing the failure of authentication or autho-
rization). As we have mentioned before, DoS attacks are not
the focus of this work. Besides, our scheme is well-compatible
with existing solutions to the proxy-absence spoofing attacks
[40] and the resource depletion attacks [16], [24], [29].
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we implement our schemes on real devices
and evaluate the overheads of our scheme with experiments.
A. Prototype Implementation
The key challenge of the implementation of our scheme is the
difficulty in obtaining open-source commercial IMD products.
Alternatively, in our prototype system, we use TelosB Mote
TPR2420 sensor node with 8 MHz TI MSP430 microcontroller,
10kB RAM, and 48kB Flash Memory as the replacement of
IMD. We choose the Rasberry Pi Version 3 Model B, a small
single-board device with 1.2GHz 64-bit quad-core CPU and
1GB RAM, to emulate the programmer. A Nexus 4 smartphone
powered by a 1.5 GHz quad-core processor with 2 GB of RAM,
is used to emulate the proxy.
In our scheme, symmetric encryption and public-key cryp-
tography are implemented using the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) algorithm and RSA algorithm, respectively.
We use 128 bits key for AES encryption and 1024 bit keys
for RSA encryption. SHA-1 is chosen for HMAC generation.
B. Testbed Specification
We developed an Android application to delegate the access
control on the Nexus 4 smartphone. This mobile application is
able to perform CP-ABE and modulate/demodulate the audio
signals. Correspondingly, we developed a client program run-
ning on the Raspberry Pi, which can decrypt the ciphertext en-
crypted using CP-ABE if the programmer operator’s attributes
satisfy the access policy embedded in the ciphertext. This client
program is also capable of modulating/demodulating audio
Fig. 6. Time - Modulation Fig. 7. Time - Demodulation
Fig. 8. Time - CP-ABE Encryption Fig. 9. Time - CP-ABE Decryption
signals. The smartphone and the programmer is connected via
an audio cable and a SYBA external USB Sound Adapter
(audio-to-USB convertor). A screenshot of the prototype is
shown in Figure 4.
We adopted the Binary Frequency-Shift Keying (BFSK)
frequency modulation scheme for modulation, in which the
digital data are converted into the analog signals at two
different frequencies for transmissions over the audio cable. For
example, the binary “0” bit is represented by the audio signal
at frequency f0 while the binary “1” bit is represented by the
audio signal at frequency f1. Figure 5 displays the results of the
signal modulation and spectrum analysis. The red signal (upper
sine waves) in Figure 5 is the analog signal after modulated
by BFSK. At the receiver end, the analog signal is sampled
to a sequence of discrete-time signal (samples). Then, we use
the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) algorithm to convert the
sampled analog signal from time domain into the frequency
domain representation, which is illustrated in Figure 5 as the
blue pulse-like signal. Specifically, the analog signal to be
demodulated can be viewed as an addition of multiple sine
signals in different frequencies. With Fourier transform, the
magnitudes of the modulated signal on various frequencies
within the spectrum range are calculated. The frequency with
the highest amplitude (i.e., maximum power) is called the peak
frequency. If the peak frequency equals f0, then the current
signal sample represents a “0” bit; while if the peak frequency
equals f0, then the signal sample represents a “1” bit. The
parameters we used for modulation and demodulation are listed
in Table I:
C. Experimental Results
To evaluate the efficiency of our scheme, we measure the
computational overheads of the protocols running on the IMD
(TelosB Mote), the proxy (Nexus 4 smartphone), and the
IMD programmer (Rasberry Pi), respectively. All the run-time
overheads are the average of 50 measurements.
1) IMD: The major cryptographic computations performed
on the IMD are the symmetric encryption and HMAC. On
TelosB node, the 128-bit AES encryption takes 2ms. For
HMAC, we estimate the length of the plaintext message
(“operate rep”, SN, IDi, IDo, EKt(D), t4) to be 78 bytes in
total, including a 4-byte command, a 2-byte sequence number,
two 4-byte IDs, and a 64-byte data/result returned). The HMAC
computation over a 78-byte massage takes 47ms.
2) IMD programmer and proxy: The IMD programmer
(Rasberry Pi) and proxy (smartphone) both need to con-
duct modulation/demodulation for their wired communications
through the audio cable. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the time
consumption for modulation and demodulation on smartphone
and Rasberry Pi, respectively. As we can see, the Rasberry
Pi has a better performance than the smartphone, and the
demodulation takes longer times than the modulation process.
Additionally, the proxy (smartphone) needs to encrypt the
temporary session key with CP-ABE encryption algorithm, and
he IMD programmer (Rasberry Pi) will run the decryption
algorithm to retrieve the key. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show
the time consumption for CP-ABE encryption on smartphone
and decryption on Rasberry Pi, respectively. The run-time
overheads for CP-ABE encryption and decryption both increase
with the number of leaf nodes (attributes). Our experiments
tested a maximum of 20 attributes, which should be sufficient
to specify the qualifications of the programmer operator. The
decryption is found to be the most time-consuming step in the
whole scheme, which takes about twice the time used for en-
cryption. Since the CP-ABE encryption/decryption is required
only once, their execution time are considered acceptable.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Most existing works employ the two-party access control
architecture, in which the IMD with constrained computational
power, battery capacity and storage must perform the access
control by itself, resulting in a relatively weak access control
and shorter IMD lifetime. Some works proposed that the IMD
should be accessible only to a group of trusted people (e.g.,
doctors, relatives) who have been added into the IMD’s access
control list (ACL) [36] [20]. The limited storage of IMD will
greatly restrict the scalability of such schemes. In addition,
the authentication of the requestor requires the verification of
the certificate/signature. The computing power and battery can
hardly afford the public-key cryptographic computations.
Some other two-party based access control schemes only
check whether the programmer is in proximity. Specifically,
IMD and the programmer need to extract certain features from
the same source simultaneously, and generate the temporary
keys based on the extracted feature, respectively. The source is
usually the signal in an out-of-band channel, such as electrocar-
diography (ECG) signal [35], body-coupled electric signal [5],
vibration [26], ultrasound [34], etc. If the programmer is close
enough to the IMD, they will derive the same (symmetric)
temporary key for the encryption of future communications.
The real-time signal measurement and key extraction compu-
tations both bring in an extra burden to the resource-constrained
IMD. Other works proposed to pre-load the patient’s biometric
information (e.g., fingerprint) or a password into the IMD.
During access, the programmer operator can manually collect
the biometric features from the patient [22] or the password
from a physical object carrying it [7], respectively. However,
the bio-features and the password engraved on an object can
be stole by the adversary. Besides, a common disadvantage
of these two types of schemes is that they only provide a
coarse-grained access control. No information about the access
requestor is acquired and validated.
By contrast, in the proxy-based architecture, the powerful
proxy device handles those resource-consuming tasks. It can
support more complicated and robust access control schemes.
However, previous proxy-based access control schemes either
depend on anomaly detection of the access pattern [24], [41]
or only verify the authenticity of the programmer [8], [40].
The former method does not check the access requestor and
require a training process for each patient. The second method
is vulnerable considering that an attacker could also purchase
or steal a legitimate programmer. Our scheme views the pro-
grammer and its operator together as one subject, and the access
decision is made based on the programmer operator. We not
only authenticate the operator, but also employ the CP-ABE
algorithm to verify the qualifications of the operator.
Key management [9], [11], [39] is essential for security.
Several papers [10], [12], [18], [19], [22], [28], [38] have
studied related security issues.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel fine-grained IMD access
control scheme based on a proxy device like the patient’s
smartphone, which will delegate the heavy access control
computations for the IMDs. To mitigate the potential wire-
less attacks, the communications between the proxy and the
IMD programmer are conducted through an audio cable. The
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption is employed to
enforce the fine-grained access control over the qualifications of
the programmer operator. We built a prototype to evaluate our
scheme. The experimental results demonstrated its feasibility
and effectiveness.
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